- The 20-page document accuses Greece of violating two directives, and five European regulations.
- Data Journalists revealed on March 16, 2024, the security vulnerabilities identified by the European Railway Agency.
- As a result of a political agreement, the country was given a huge amount of time to comply. However, no substantial progress has been made.”
- In light of the Tempi tragedy, there has been serious criticism of Greece’s failure to ensure proper investigation of accidents.
By Aris Chatzigeorgiou
Serious deficiencies in the way the Greek railway operates safely, some of which were known before the Tempi crime occurred, are included in the Commission’s letter in which Greece is referred to the European Commission for violating two European directives and five regulations.
Serious shortcomings in the safe operation of Greece’s rail system, some of which were known before the tragic Tempi crime, are detailed in a letter from the European Commission. The letter accuses Greece of violating two European directives and five regulations, and initiates legal action against the country.
On December 16, 2024, the European Commission announced that it had launched infringement proceedings by sending a formal notice to Greece for failing to comply with EU railway safety legislation, in particular Directive 2016/798 on railway safety. Today, Data Journalists reveals the full 20-page warning letter, which goes beyond the short official statement issued on December 16. The document accuses Greece of allowing its railways to operate without complying with EU safety requirements.
Readers of the detailed letter will understand, despite the formal legal language and bureaucratic phrasing, the extensive deficiencies in Greece’s rail system. Regular followers of Data Journalists will note that the problems outlined in the letter closely match those identified by the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) in late 2023. The ERA was tasked with uncovering safety gaps following the Tempi tragedy. Data Journalists previously revealed the findings of the ERA’s final report in a March 16, 2024 article titled ” Revelation: 10 euro bombs for the Greek Railway.”
Despite requests from MEPs to the European Commission, the European Railway Agency’s (ERA) final report on Greek rail safety has never been officially published. Why was Greece given a full year to address these issues before infringement proceedings were launched? Evidence suggests that this leniency stemmed from a political agreement between the Commission’s leadership and the Greek government to avoid repercussions during the Greek election period. This political maneuvering became even more apparent when Greece successfully lobbied for the appointment of Greek officials to EU transport bodies. One such official is the newly elected Transport Commissioner, Apostolos Tzitzikostas, whose signature appears on the warning letter. Tzitzikostas now faces the test of whether he was appointed to protect the Mitsotakis government or whether he will address the issues with the seriousness they require, honor the memory of the victims of the Tempi tragedy and restore confidence in the Greek rail system.
It is recalled that the European Commission, in its announcement of December 16, 2002, stated that Greece has two months to provide an official response “and to remedy the shortcomings identified“. However, anyone who reads the letter will understand that deficiencies of this nature cannot be resolved in two months – especially when they have not been addressed for the past year, despite being known to the European Union Railway Agency (ERA) and at least to Brussels. It seems, therefore, that the Commission has decided to be lenient with Greece, as reflected in its December announcement: “The Commission considers that there are long-standing shortcomings in Greece’s implementation of the Directive since its entry into force. These shortcomings are systemic and also stem from a lack of safety culture within the relevant organizations”. In other words, there is no mention of the responsibility of a government that has been dealing with these issues for 4.5 years. On the contrary: “The Commission notes that, following the report of the European Union Agency for Railways on the state of transposition and application of EU railway legislation in Greece, the Greek government, after consultations and agreements with the Commission services, adopted an action plan. The Action Plan provides the basis for addressing the shortcomings and satisfactory progress has been made in its implementation, with Greece submitting bi-monthly reports to the Commission on the progress achieved. However, shortcomings in the implementation of the Directive remain. The Commission is therefore sending a letter of formal notice to Greece, which now has two months to respond and remedy the shortcomings identified by the Commission formally. In the absence of a satisfactory response, the Commission may decide to issue a reasoned opinion.
Read the full letter here
This “Action Plan” is often cited by the Greek government as a defense when it faces difficulties, claiming that it is doing everything possible to address the problems. The 20-page letter from Tzitzikostas also makes several references to the Action Plan, along with the actions the Greek government claims to have taken. However, at no point are these actions or their results explicitly detailed. Furthermore, the legal basis on which this action plan was developed is not specified.
During a parliamentary debate on a bill allegedly introduced and passed to benefit the Greek railway system, the mysterious “Action Plan” with its undisclosed contents was repeatedly brought up by the opposition. SYRIZA’s transport spokesman, Alexandros Meikopoulos, called the Action Plan a “secret plan”, a “mythical document containing incredible measures that will supposedly transform the Greek railway system from the ground up”. He called on the Minister of Infrastructure and Transport, Christos Staikouras, to present the plan to Parliament. Meikopoulos also asked Staikouras to clarify under which law the process for drafting and consulting with the European Commission on this action plan is provided for, and whether a similar process has been followed for any other country found to be in breach of EU law. Questions about the content of the action plan were also raised by SYRIZA leader Sokratis Famellos, PASOK representative Dimitris Mantzos and Konstantinos Boubas of the Hellenic Solution party. Staikouras’ only response was to mention a letter from the European Commission in July 2024 (before the appointment of Apostolos Tzitzikostas) stating that the plan was “moving in the right direction and should be implemented”. However, no details were given about the content of the action plan or its legal basis – which is binding on Greece after such a serious rail tragedy. Let us now examine some of the key points of the warning letter to Greece:
Connection to the Tempi Incident
The recipient of the warning letter is Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, who had previously taken over the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport as State Minister in an unusual arrangement following the Tempi train tragedy and the resignation of Kostas Karamanlis. It is clear that the ERA investigation began on March 10, 2023, ten days after the Tempi tragedy, on the orders of the Commission. The “final report” was delivered on October 13, 2023, containing “certain findings confirming the failure of the Hellenic Republic to comply with certain obligations under EU law”. Six months passed before Greece submitted the Action Plan to the Commission on April 3, 2024. Since then, Greece has submitted two “progress reports” purporting to demonstrate compliance with the Action Plan – one at the end of September and another at the end of November 2024.
Violations of 7 Directives and Regulations
Based on ERA’s findings and despite the (undisclosed) efforts of the Greek government, Greece has violated the following obligations
- Directive (EU) 2016/798, Article 4(1), Article 9(1), Article 9(3)(c), (e) and (f), Article 9(4), Article 13(4), Article 16(1), Article 20(1), Article 22(1) and (2), and Article 24(2) and (3).
- Commission Regulation (EU) No 1078/2012, Article 3(1) and Annex I.
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013, Article 2(1), Articles 4 and 5 and Annex I.
- Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 2018/761, Article 6.
- Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/762, Annex I, point 1.1(d) and (e) and points 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 6.1 and Annex II, point 1.1(d) and (e) and points 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 4.2.1 and 6.1.
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/779, Article 6(3).
- Directive (EU) 2016/797, Article 27(5) and Articles 28 and 39.
All of the above directives and regulations contain specific requirements for railway safety management systems, allocation of responsibilities, staffing of bodies, training of personnel, investigation of accidents with independence from the government and the entities involved, and procedures for informing about changes to the systems, among others.
Common safety methods
A key requirement for the European Union is the interoperability of rail systems so that a passenger feels equally safe no matter which European system they are traveling on. However, as stated in the first sub-chapter for Greece:
- “Most of the safety management system documentation analyzed by ERA is not adapted to the specificities of individual organizations and is not applied in practice. Some of the processes described in this documentation do not refer to current EU legislation or to outdated versions of it”.
- “The change management process is not properly implemented by most stakeholders in Greece”.
- “All inspected railway undertakings and the infrastructure manager in Greece (OSE) do not apply adequate monitoring procedures. There is no link between risk assessment and monitoring”.
“The Commission acknowledges the plans and progress made so far, but at the same time notes that the above concerns will remain until the action plan is fully implemented”. This sentence is quoted almost verbatim in six different places in the warning letter for Greece’s referral, without providing detailed information on the plans and progress.
Lack of independent investigation
Greece has not ensured that “the national investigative body responsible for the independent investigation of accidents and incidents (E.O.D.A.S.A.A.M.) has adequate resources to carry out its tasks”. In fact, E.O.D.A.S.A.A.M. did not even exist when the Tempi tragedy occurred and today, two years later, it has only 3 railway investigators instead of the required 8. In addition, Greece has not ensured that accident investigations are completed within 12 months of the incident (for the Tempi tragedy, completion is expected to take 2 years). E.O.D.A.S.A.A.M. has also failed to prepare and publish an “annual report” on its activities.
More importantly, Greece did not ensure that a truly independent investigation was carried out by E.O.D.A.S.A.A.M, free from the fear that its findings would upset the interests of the government and the companies involved in the accident. As stated: “It is noted that the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport is responsible for the operation of the infrastructure manager, O.S.E., and therefore has interests that may conflict with the tasks assigned to the investigative body. On the other hand, E.O.D.A.S.A.A.M. is in a state of extensive operational and financial dependence on this Ministry”. “As a result, it cannot be guaranteed that E.O.D.A.S.A.A.M. will be able to carry out independent investigations into O.S.E.,” it said. In this regard, the Commission “acknowledges the progress made” by citing Greece’s commitment to “amend Law 5014/2023, which aims to strengthen the independence of the E.O.D.A.S.A.M.”. The question is why this amendment was not included in the law voted before Christmas concerning the railways and EODASAAM, which was discussed at the same time as the European Union’s “yellow card”.
Findings before the Tempi tragedy
Shortcomings identified before the Tempi accident relate to the understaffing of the Hellenic Railway Regulatory Authority (RAS), which, according to the letter, “performs the role of the national safety authority and operates independently”. “However, its ability to carry out all the tasks assigned to it is limited due to insufficient resources and difficulties in recruiting new staff”. In other words, the lack of personnel is not attributed to the government, but to the procedures of the ASEP (Supreme Council for the Selection of Civil Personnel). And this was not discovered after the Tempi accident, but “in a separate report by the Agency (ERA) …., which was communicated to the Greek government on December 21, 2022”. In other words, it has been known since 2022 that the RAS lacks the staff to carry out its regulatory role, and even today, two years later, “only 7 employees work exclusively on the tasks of the National Safety Authority, which is insufficient compared to the extensive lists of tasks assigned to the RAS”. Nevertheless, the Commission “acknowledges the progress made”.
One area where “progress” is not recognized is the fact that while Greece has entrusted RAS with the task of certifying those who maintain rolling stock, it has not ensured that RAS meets the criteria of an organization that performs such certifications!
Delegating Responsibilities: A task beyond our reach
In short, and based on what is stated in Tzitzikostas’ letter, prior to the Tempi accident, an entire railway system was operating without anyone having the ability to supervise it, certify it, or investigate its shortcomings. This was not only because the RAS was understaffed, while the Hellenic Railway Accident Investigation Authority (E.O.D.A.S.A.A.M) had not even been established, but also because Greece had wrongly delegated to the RAS responsibilities that should have remained with the central government. For some reason, with Law 4632, which the government adopted shortly after taking office, it delegated to the RAS the responsibility for the “allocation of roles and responsibilities” within the railway system, whereas “only the governments of the Member States have the necessary powers” to do so. The results are described in the Commission’s letter in the most complex way possible:
- “The absence of a systemic and risk-based approach among the Greek stakeholders. The dominant approach is the application of a rule-based system based on national regulations, rather than the application of prior identification and risk management”.
- “Operational safety depends largely on the correct work of individual employees, which is the only risk control measure”.
- “Stakeholders in the Greek railway sector do not use the tools provided by Directive (EU) 2016/798, which are designed to facilitate the implementation of a systemic approach.”
- “There is no common understanding of the main risks related to the Greek railway sector. Even when certain risks are identified, no specific measures are taken to address them and it is unclear who should be responsible for them.”
Discussion about this post