- What really happened during the deadliest peacetime mission in the history of the armed forces?
- For the first time, Data Journalists reveal a written and thoroughly substantiated account of what happened before, during, and after the tragedy.
- The harrowing testimony of a senior officer about the moment of the crash and the vehicle that “rammed” the bus.
- The lack of planning and preparation for the operation, as well as the “verbal” orders of the then Chief of the Greek Defense General Staff, Konstantinos Floros.
- The allegations made in a lawsuit against the Greek state, Dendias and Gerapetritis by a senior officer who participated in the mission.
By Paris Karvounopoulos
Shocking negligence, infuriating disorganization, and an appalling lack of professionalism were the factors that combined to cause the deaths of five people – three military personnel and two civilians – during the disastrous mission of the Greek Armed Forces in Libya in September 2023.
- Sixteen months after the “Death Mission”, Data Journalists reveal the full truth, which has been persistently concealed, through a document of undeniable authenticity.
- The lawsuit was filed by a high-ranking officer who participated in the mission, suffered serious injuries, and continues to suffer from the consequences. The lawsuit targets the Greek state, specifically naming Defense Minister Nikos Dendias and Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis.
- Despite the staggering errors and omissions that led to the tragedy, not only has no one been held accountable, but some involved have even been promoted.
This mission, which led to the largest peacetime loss of life in the armed forces, was officially intended as a humanitarian aid operation to Libya in September 2023. However, it should serve as a case study in military academies of how not to conduct an operation. Many rumors have circulated in whispers, and more has been written about the causes of this tragedy. Now the truth is revealed.
Data Journalists presents the first detailed and thoroughly substantiated description of events leading up to the mission, during its execution on Libyan soil, and in the aftermath of the tragedy.
A senior officer who was part of the mission gives a minute-by-minute account as part of a lawsuit filed against the state. The officer’s testimony is nothing short of astonishing and leaves readers stunned. No one could have imagined the level of recklessness that existed in the upper echelons of the political and military leadership of the armed forces.
The lack of preparation for the mission and growing concerns
The senior officer’s testimony begins with the so-called preparation for the mission, shedding light on the astonishing lack of planning. The officer recounts:
*”On Thursday, September 14, 2023, at approximately 15:30, while I was on a 24-hour duty shift, I was verbally informed by the Deputy Director, Brigadier General D…, and the supervising officer, Ms. Mitsiou, that I had been selected – based on criteria that were never disclosed to me – to travel to Libya with my colleague G.K. on a humanitarian mission to provide medical assistance in the Derna region.
As they explained, the order was verbal and came directly from the Chief of the Greek Defense General Staff, Konstantinos Floros. We were given no further details except that our possible departure time was set for two days later, specifically Saturday, September 16, 2023, when we would depart on a military plane from Elefsina Air Base. At that moment, I expressed my objections to the deputy director, both because the mission was outside the competence of the Medical Corps and because of the informal nature of the directive…*.
Is it conceivable that verbal orders would be given for such a mission? And yet, as the senior officer describes, that is exactly what happened. After completing his 24-hour duty shift, the officer had to begin gathering materials for the humanitarian mission to Libya. He also had to address several health-related concerns, including the vaccinations required for personnel participating in the mission.
On the afternoon of September 15, one day after receiving the verbal order, the officer again asked for a written order. To his surprise, he was told that “the order had not yet been issued in writing”. He adds, “I was also informed by the Director of the 1st Office that there was no document or signal regarding the mission,” as stated in his lawsuit.
The surprises did not stop there. The officer was shocked to discover that “in a group chat on social media (Viber), we were asked to send pictures of our passports.”
Due to the passport problems of the members of the mission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forced to postpone the departure of the mission for 24 hours, rescheduling it for the morning of Sunday, September 17. However, the concerns of the mission members became even more pronounced. In his lawsuit, the officer explains the reasons for his unease:
“I was informed that we would be unarmed, as directed by the State Department. This raised my concerns, which were exacerbated by the speech of General Choupis, commander of the Special Warfare Command, at the Elefsina Air Base during the departure of the mission. Among other things, he stated that “there is neither a clear mission nor a precise understanding of where we will be based or operate.
In addition, the photographing of the mission and its immediate publication raised further concerns for me, given the destination country. We were also told that our communications would be managed through SIM cards provided to us in Benghazi. In addition, we were briefed on the area of operation by a captain using a mobile application that showed destroyed routes. This captain did not even accompany us on the mission. The same officer told us about a local contact named Alexis who was supposedly coordinating everything. However, he did not show us a photo of this person and only mentioned that Alexis had supposedly made all the arrangements. We were also informed of a last-minute change in the landing airport and the routes we would follow. My anxiety peaked when I realized that our safety would depend entirely on one person.
The mission arrives in Benghazi
At noon on September 17, the C-130 carrying the Greek mission landed in Benghazi. The officer’s detailed and evocative account vividly captures the scene:
“Arrival at the Benghazi airport (12:00) was unwelcoming, as evidenced by the cleanliness of the toilets provided for our use. Meanwhile, the accompanying armored vehicles carried two heavily armed men each, in stark contrast to us. Notably, the communication SIM cards were never provided (!), so I activated roaming and sent a message to my wife to inform her of our arrival in Benghazi. To my surprise, she already knew because she had heard about it from the media (a leak of military information)”.
The officer also highlights a critical oversight: neither the vehicles nor the accompanying personnel were ever inspected by the mission’s security officers.
The fatal journey of the bus to tragedy
The description of the bus ride leading up to the moment of tragedy vividly illustrates the consequences of the staggering carelessness with which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Hellenic Defense General Staff handled the situation:
“Upon boarding the bus, one of our Greek-Libyan translators advised us not to look out of the windows and to keep the curtains tightly closed for security reasons. He also mentioned that there would be a refueling stop (!) in the middle of the trip, which was expected to take nearly five hours. The Consul, Mr. Venizelos, did not board the bus – only the military and the three translators were present. The speed of the bus was excessive, exceeding 120 kilometers per hour throughout the trip, despite complaints and warnings from passengers. The lead security vehicle drove even faster; at times we overtook it, while at other times it was far ahead – at a distance inappropriate for a convoy vehicle. Following behind were the truck with the mission supplies and another armored vehicle. Due to the extreme speed and poor road conditions, I buckled my seat belt. My seat was one row in the back, on the left. About two and a half hours into the trip, the bus stopped for about ten minutes to refuel. During this time, the bus was not evacuated and there was no supervision of the refueling process by the security officer. Shortly thereafter, at the insistence of everyone on board, the bus stopped again for a rest period and all passengers disembarked. We then reboarded and continued our journey at the same dizzying speed”.
The moment of impact
How and with what did the collision occur? The officer describes:
“The violent collision occurred about half an hour after our rest stop, involving a white TOYOTA pick-up truck carrying about 1-2 people. I couldn’t tell if there were other passengers because the closed curtains and my seat position restricted my view. At that moment I couldn’t even see the lead security vehicle as it kept changing its distance and had moved out of sight in front of us.
The collision occurred on the front left side of the bus after the vehicle left its straight path, re-entered the tarmac without slowing down, and collided at a combined speed of approximately 200 kilometers per hour.
The pick-up had an external fuel tank. The bus almost came to a stop as if it had hit a wall. The collision lifted the rear wheels and a fire immediately broke out, producing thick black smoke. The smoke was so thick that it obscured the view of the front half of the bus and almost reached the rear left axle, leaving me with only the wreckage”.
Chaos after the collision
The description of the aftermath of the collision is dramatic:
“After the collision, I suffered injuries to my head, neck, upper and lower limbs, a nosebleed from damage to the nasal tissues, several bleeding lacerations, and severe musculoskeletal injuries, despite wearing my seatbelt, because the intensity of the crash had compressed the seating area to such an extent that the passenger behind me ended up with his head in mine. I escaped bleeding through the right rear side window, which was smashed by Corporal T… and Sergeant I… immediately after the crash. The fall from the window injured most of us, both from the broken glass and the height of the fall (over 2.5 meters), as well as the rocky ground.
I felt on the verge of unconsciousness and had blurred vision at least three times, but the danger of fire and possible explosion gave me the strength to get up and walk away from the burning bus. As I moved away, about 15 paces from the vehicle, the bus exploded and the thermal shock wave knocked me back to the ground. Everyone was shouting for us to get away as quickly as possible and more explosions followed. Within 2 minutes there was almost destruction.
Unarmed and without communications in hostile territory
The Greek soldiers found themselves in hostile territory, unarmed, and without reliable communications. The criminal mistakes of those who didn’t plan an operation but a ‘trip’ to Libya led to the death of five passengers on the bus and put the lives of the others in immediate danger. Read how the senior officer who brought the claim describes what happened after the explosions:
“Those of us who managed to escape moved about 50 meters away from the burning vehicle. Those of us who were bleeding lay down and removed the badge and flag from our uniforms for safety as it was unclear exactly what had happened. Nurse T… applied an ischaemic dressing to the bleeding upper limb of Sergeant I… while I, following my instructions, placed Captain R… in the recovery position as he was in shock, probably hemorrhagic, in addition to the burns he had sustained. As far as my condition permitted, I gave instructions and assistance to the more seriously injured. Due to the severity of the accident, no one could rule out internal bleeding, which is the most common cause of death in collisions due to ruptured vessels and organs. We were the only ones administering first aid.
Specifically, after checking my nosebleed, I immediately sent an information message to the General of the Army General Staff – Medical Directorate, Kasimos D., but received no reply. So, even though I didn’t want to worry my wife in any way, I sent her a message telling her that I was fine so that she wouldn’t worry and that there had been an accident with injuries and fire 2.5 hours from Benghazi to Derna while asking her to notify the Army General Staff / Operations Centre, which she successfully did“.
The officer goes on to say: “The operations center had no information about the accident because they had not ensured continuous communication with the mission commander, as is normally required. Their last communication was at Benghazi airport about 2.5 hours earlier. This is why they asked my wife for information and did not understand or know about the communication restrictions in the area, which could only be done via SMS and roaming activation, telling my wife that my phone was switched off. The update was made about 30 minutes (16:07) after the crash, from a private mobile phone only, as there was no other communication, as was all communication until our final transport on the C-130 to Athens.
We were never provided with maps compatible with the country, nor with any other communication or GPS tracking system. The other means of communication were destroyed on the bus. The only means of communication was my mobile phone with messages, and my only link was my wife.
Transporting the injured Greek soldiers was also a difficult and dangerous ordeal:
The first transport – farm vehicles and old ambulances – arrived in about 50 minutes. There was panic at the scene. Sergeant Major I… and Master Sergeant T… went to see where the others were, but found only the Colonel lying about 8 meters in front of the bus, with multiple injuries and unable to move. He was given priority for transport, along with R…, and we followed. About an hour later we arrived at the rural clinic in the area, where there were minimal resources to treat us. There were no supplies for local antiseptic treatment, only gauze and saline”.
The injured soldiers were then transported, again over the same terrible road network, for an hour and a half to the TAKNIS hospital.
It was there that the senior officer who described the events had his first contact with a military representative from Athens. General Dimitris Choupis, then Commander of the Special Warfare Command, who was supposedly in charge of the mission, contacted him. The injured officer informed him of the dramatic events and urgently requested air evacuation by Chinook helicopter from Crete.
The soldiers were transferred again, this time for four hours, to the private Benghazi Specialised Hospital. There, the consul and the “liaison” Alexis T…, who was supposedly in charge of organizing everything, visited the injured and expressed their sorrow at what had happened.
Heavily armed evacuation team arrives in Libya
After being informed of the deadly and unprecedented fiasco of the mission, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) sent a medical team by air to bring the injured back to Athens. The medical team was accompanied by a heavily armed unit wearing full body armor. Did it really take the loss of five of our people for them to realize that?
The injured Greek military personnel were airlifted to Athens and admitted to the 401 General Military Hospital, the 251 General Air Force Hospital, and the Naval Hospital of Athens. The senior officer who filed the lawsuit recalls what the then Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (C/HNDGS), Konstantinos Floros, said to him and his wife:
“Everyone expressed their sorrow for the incident, while the C/HNDGS apologized to my wife, stating that he accepted his share of the blame, that he had not foreseen the possibility of a traffic accident (!), and that he would take this into account for future missions”.
The senior officer emphasizes:
“I would like to emphasize that the most important aspect in the movement of a convoy is the potential for a traffic accident or collision, which must be anticipated and avoided by all possible means. This is achieved through thorough checks and rechecks of routes, vehicles, drivers, and, where possible, lane closures, continuous communication, vehicle and personnel security, and, where necessary, the use of armored vehicles. This is particularly important in missions such as this, where the situation in the area is volatile, with terrorist activity and a generally unclear and insecure environment.
In practice, the visits we received were purely procedural. No one asked if there were any additional needs, not even to provide a service vehicle for my wife, who visited me daily by taxi, and to whom they owed their notification of the incident.”
The senior officer’s complaint is described as well documented, citing protocols for such missions – none of which were followed. The Libya mission was treated as a publicity stunt for television, an opportunity to showcase another “success” of the political and military leadership. This follows an earlier “evacuation” of Greeks from Sudan, which was actually a mission to the Egyptian border, where Greek nationals were handed over by foreign forces.
Through his lawsuit, the senior officer is seeking compensation of around €600,000 from the Greek government.
Despite the unprecedented and blatant fiasco, no one has yet faced any consequences. In particular, the then head of the Special Warfare Command, who was theoretically responsible for the Libya mission, was not only not retired, but was promoted to the position of Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (C/HNDGS) in the subsequent reshuffle of the armed forces. There was no mention of any resignations – it seems that the thought never even crossed anyone’s mind.
