- Why the government’s promises to modernize the railways were derailed.
- Exclusive: The prophetic 2019 article by then Secretary General for Transport, Nikolaos Stathopoulos, in which he describes Contract 717 as “the most critical project in Greece.”
- The truth about staff shortages, freelancers hired on short-term contracts, and the training that never takes place.
- The dangers posed by safety systems that were never installed, as well as problems with rolling stock and level crossings.
- The gutted network, the maintenance shambles, and the delays.
By Aris Chatzigeorgiou
The three years since the crime in Tempi have proven that the “great train robbery,” which caused the head-on collision on February 28, 2023, continues unabated. During this time, the government has failed to address any of the fundamental problems or close the gaps that left 57 families in mourning, pushed the Greek railway into decline, and left society with relentless questions about justice.
From the beginning of this three-year period, Data Journalists have exposed what preceded the tragedy through a series of reports. They have revealed the soap opera–like investigation that resulted in responsibilities being whitewashed, conflicts of interest among key figures, and government actions that continue to threaten the existence of the Greek railway—even as the government repeatedly promises to restore it.
Today, we will review the gaps that persist in the Greek railway system. At the same time, we will reveal a prophetic text written by a senior government official at the end of 2019. At that time, the New Democracy government under Kyriakos Mitsotakis had only been in power for a few months, and many believed that it had the capacity to correct the mistakes of the past. This was before various so-called “Truth Groups” assumed a central role.
The text was written by Nikolaos Stathopoulos, the Secretary General for Transport at the time, as part of a collective publication on the Infrastructure and Transport Sector. Mr. Stathopoulos had also served as Secretary General for Transport under the Samaras–Venizelos government prior to 2015. He abruptly resigned in March 2021, citing “personal reasons,” and was replaced by Giannis Xifaras. Data Journalists have extensively covered Mr. Xifaras’s role in the “cover-up” of Tempi.
Αποκάλυψη-βόμβα: Ο Ξιφαράς έδωσε την εντολή για το μπάζωμα στα Τέμπη
As the competent Secretary General for Transport, N. Stathopoulos was invited to contribute to Infrastructure & Transport Review 2018–2019. This volume was published under the editorial supervision of two websites that specialize in infrastructure and transport. The websites organize conferences, promote companies that win or bid on projects, spotlight key players involved in project allocation, and highlight governments that boast about them.
Mr. Stathopoulos does something chillingly prophetic. Instead of listing the dozens of projects totaling billions of euros that a typical technocrat might have included, he focuses on a €41 million contract that was unknown to the public at the time. Contract 717, concerning the restoration of the railway’s remote control and signaling systems!!!
It was the same contract that all of Greece came to know in the most tragic way in March 2023 when, after the head-on collision at Tempi, it became clear that the disaster could have been prevented if the project had been completed instead of becoming entangled in repeated extensions, changes to its terms, and additional compensation claims. The contract prompted the intervention of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which issued serious indictments against state officials but not political figures, who remained beyond reach.
In 2019, the Secretary General titled his text “The Most Critical Project in Greece,” referring to Contract 717. He begins somewhat apologetically, writing that, since he was asked to contribute “something like a greeting,” it should have a “programmatic or visionary character.” However, he goes on to explain why he ultimately decided to address it “in the form of a warning” (!!!) regarding what, in his view, was the most critical project in the country at that time—one that concerned the railway.
He then provides background information, stating that the project was awarded at the end of 2014 and was scheduled for completion by September 2016, placing responsibility on the SYRIZA government for what he describes as “hasty and largely destructive management” during the 2015–2019 period. He describes Contract 717, a relatively small project, as a “gem,” arguing that it would have reduced travel time between Athens and Thessaloniki to three and a half hours. This would have “turned Thessaloniki into a geopolitical hub of the Balkan hinterland and Macedonia into a central region of the country at a time of broader geopolitical realignments.” “If 717 fails, these developments will not be set in motion, and it will take at least another ten years for the same window of opportunity to reappear. By then, it will most likely be too late,” he warns.
He explains that, without Contract 717, the modern rolling stock that TRAIΝOSE (now Hellenic Train) was supposed to introduce by the end of 2020 would be pointless. He also reveals that the Italians had preliminarily agreed to invest €450–500 million following a meeting between Kyriakos Mitsotakis and his Italian counterpart. However, by 2022, these investments had shrunk to just five refurbished ETR trains originally built in the 1990s. “But those trains (the modern ones worth €450–500 million) require the completion of Contract 717. Without it, they will never reach the necessary speeds on Greek infrastructure. For the Italians to schedule these investments, they need a timetable now for completing the systems provided for under Contract 717. This is essential to move from the preliminary agreement to the final signing of the contract with the agreed-upon investments. If, therefore, 717 is not completed…” he writes, trailing off in a warning ellipsis.
Mr. Stathopoulos concludes the well-worth-reading text with two striking paragraphs: “Once again, there is little point in speaking of visions and future plans for the Greek railway reaching the Danube ports. What matters is proving that we can bring Athens and Thessaloniki closer together and make Greece greater in the process. On the 200th anniversary of the 1821 Revolution, we must understand that visions are built through tangible projects, not empty declarations and triumphalist planning. Our credibility in future planning depends on our ability to maintain the opportunity for 717.” This credibility was tragically disproven.
In the months following the publication of the above text, Contract 717 remained “frozen.” N. Stathopoulos left the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport in March 2021 amid reports of disagreements with the then-minister, Kostas Achilleas Karamanlis. Despite being from Macedonia, Karamanlis did not appear particularly interested in projects that would upgrade Thessaloniki and the wider region. Despite the existence of the 717 project, two trains traveling on the same track in opposite directions collided head-on on February 28, 2023.
Contract 717 became notorious because the systems were still not operational nine years after it was signed. The former Secretary General’s warnings would remain buried in the 2019 volume while the government embarked on a communications campaign to obscure its responsibilities through farcical parliamentary inquiry committees, the disappearance of evidence, investigative maneuvering, and inconclusive technical probes. Tragically, the former Secretary General’s predictions would be borne out in every respect. To this day, the Greek railway remains a shadow of its former self. Three years after Tempi, the fundamental gaps in its operation remain vast.
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SAFETY SYSTEMS
Despite repeated government announcements immediately following the Tempi incident, the remote control and signaling systems, as well as the automatic braking system (ETCS), still fail to cover the entire Athens–Thessaloniki axis. Contract 717 was supposedly accepted just before Storm Daniel hit in September 2023. The storm destroyed the project along a critical section of the line in Thessaly. Despite the government’s decision to award the restoration work through direct assignment to expedite its completion, the contract was signed almost two years later. Mr. Kyranakis is now asking the entire nation to praise him because sometime in 2026, the systems will be restored—but only along the Athens–Thessaloniki corridor. It remains unclear when other parts of the railway network will be covered and whether trains are currently operating there, such as on the Attica–Peloponnese suburban railway, or not, as in Northern Greece, Kalambaka, and Volos.
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STAFFING
Staff levels at the Greek railway remain minimal, essentially unchanged since the first bailout memoranda in 2010. At that time, the OSE was forced to lay off thousands of employees and lose their expertise. At the restructured OSE, which is now responsible for maintaining infrastructure, supervising projects, and planning new initiatives, only about 600 of the 2,500 positions outlined in the organizational chart have been filled. Meanwhile, the appointed management received generous pay raises, and a hiring process was launched for 33 new directors.
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“FREELANCE” CONTRACTS
Even the recruitment process launched in 2022 through ASEP under fast-track procedures remains frozen. This process would have filled critical positions, such as stationmaster, switch operator, and technician. These gaps are being patched together haphazardly by hiring individuals without open competition. Often, these individuals are relatives of existing employees. They are paid via a Service Provision Receipt, commonly known as a “blocaki” (freelance contractor status), without knowing whether they will continue working in the future.
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TRAINING
The training of new stationmasters and switch operators working under freelance contracts has been heavily criticized as inadequate. Mistakes are common, including giving incorrect instructions and occasionally sending trains in the wrong direction. Most notably, in October 2024, a suburban train almost entered the Metro’s underground network at Doukissis Plakentias. Notably, the Railway Regulatory Authority identified training gaps for 75 stationmasters (including the one in Larissa) following the incident at Tempi. However, the €1 million fine initially threatened was not imposed on OSE until November 2025.
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OVERSIGHT AUTHORITIES
The Railway Regulatory Authority (RAS) is supposed to act as the National Safety Authority, but staffing remains minimal. However, its management was granted generous pay raises and is now compensated at the level of the President of the Supreme Court. The official state investigative body, EODASAAM, also has sparse staffing. Notably, EODASAAM had not even been established when the Tempi accident occurred. Consequently, evidence collection was entrusted to railway accident investigators. Numerous investigations that the EODASAAM should have conducted over the past two years remain pending.
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HUMAN FACTOR
Numerous reports issued after Tempi emphasize the importance of the human factor for the proper functioning of the railway, beyond the safety systems that intervene when errors occur. The EODASAAM report contains numerous references and recommendations regarding the safety culture that must be cultivated among personnel. The same applies to the October 2023 report by the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA), which formed the basis for referring Greece to the European Court of Justice for violating specific regulations and directives. Of course, achieving this requires hiring staff based on merit, a step that is still pending.
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ROLLING STOCK
After Tempi, no new rolling stock was procured. In fact, the five ETR “arrows” brought in by Hellenic Train were left unmaintained and sidelined. Numerous other units were also taken out of service due to malfunctions and inadequate maintenance. Only recently was a new agreement signed under which Hellenic Train will deliver 23 new trains. If all goes well, these trains will not run on Greek rails until after summer 2027. However, they will have lower specifications and a maximum speed of 160 km/h compared to the 200 km/h of older OSE trains.
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GUTTED NETWORK
The severe shortage of rolling stock continues to result in canceled services. On the main Athens–Thessaloniki route, only two pairs of trains run daily, compared to five before the Tempi disaster and seven prior to that. A striking sign of total decline is that services between Thessaloniki and Serres have been suspended without adequate explanation. Additionally, Florina has remained without a train since Tempi. Numerous local tourist lines of significant importance, such as the Diakopto–Kalavryta rack railway, the Pelion train, and the Katakolo–Olympia line, have seen substantial reductions. This occurs while Hellenic Train receives an annual state subsidy of €62 million (adjusted for inflation) to operate these socially necessary but unprofitable routes.
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SLOW MOVEMENTS
Hellenic Train defends itself by pointing to the promised delivery of 23 new trains while arguing that they cannot operate on a poorly maintained network. Large and critical sections of this network, such as the stretch just outside Athens between Acharnes (SKA) and Oinoi, suffer from severe wear on the rails and switches. To avoid accidents, trains must pass over 15 points at very low speeds, sometimes as slow as 20 km/h. These slow movements cause significant delays; a 60-kilometer journey takes an hour, whereas it could be completed in 30 minutes. The major project to restore this section has been pending for 10 years. It is now under consideration by the Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations (HCAP) and is estimated to cost €300 million, up from the €100 million estimated in 2018.
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LEVEL CROSSINGS
Level crossings, where trains intersect with roads, remain a problem due to frequent barrier failures and inadequate supervision. The staffing needs that were once met by OSE personnel with proper training are now met by security companies whose staff stay only briefly, unable to cope with the difficult conditions. Problems at level crossings are common, even in the urban area of Attica, where personnel may work long shifts without provisions to address the effects of fatigue.
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ACTION PLAN
Forgotten in some… drawer, the action plan that the Greek government had agreed upon with the European Commission in Brussels to prevent Greece’s referral to the European Court of Justice in 2024 has seemed dormant in recent months. Referral had been threatened following ERA’s 2023 findings on staff shortages and legislative gaps regarding responsibility for railway safety. In March 2025, inside Parliament and after massive rallies over the Tempi disaster, then-Minister of Infrastructure and Transport Christos Staikouras revealed the Action Plan’s provisions, acknowledging Greece’s poor legislative framework. A few weeks later, Staikouras was removed from office, and Kostas Kyranakis took responsibility for the railway. The new minister, energized by the so-called “Truth Group,” made many promises, the first of which was a train tracking system that was supposed to be operational by last summer. This system, which would allow us to monitor trains as easily as we track our souvlaki deliveries, still does not work. Meanwhile, the signing of the new contract for the state subsidy to Hellenic Train, which is owned by Italians, made it clear that the main purpose of the tracking system will be to monitor Hellenic Train’s services in order to release subsidies monthly in advance rather than waiting until the following year.
