- Questions arise over the Prosecutor’s Decision to close the case
- It took four and a half years of investigations for the Justice system to shift responsibility onto “Medea” and private entities.
- Data Journalists reveal:
a) The wildfire-prevention projects that were never carried out
b) The aircraft that never took flight
c) The miscommunication and chaos surrounding the aerial resources
by Vangelis Triantis
It was all “Medea’s” fault, the extreme weather, and the private landowners who failed to clear their forested plots. This, among other things, was the conclusion of the Chalcis Prosecutor’s Office in the ruling that closed the extensive case file on the fire that, in August 2021, devastated Northern Evia.
After four and a half years of investigation, the justice system reached a conclusion that was more or less predetermined. This ignores the fact that forestry officials “admitted” in their testimonies that wildfire prevention projects worth €2.091 million had not been carried out in the area when the catastrophic fire broke out. Never mind that Fire Service officers, in a report they filed, described a few aerial patrols and complete chaos in coordination. The Justice system ruled that everything had been handled properly and that no officials were responsible.
All this happened while Northern Evia suffered massive destruction, with over 500,000 stremmas of forest land burned and unburned alike. Meanwhile, the Fire Service’s full attention was focused on extinguishing the fire in Varibobi.
Data Journalists are publishing “explosive” documents showing that the state apparatus failed to function properly once again.
The Chalcis Prosecutor’s Filing Order
The No. 03/26 ruling of the Chalcis Court of First Instance was issued on January 5, 2026. The case file on the Northern Evia fire arose from the merging of seven separate case files that had been opened following complaints by Northern Evia residents against state officials. The officials were accused of the following offenses: arson by negligence in a forest; arson by negligence, causing common danger to property and risking human life by omission; bodily harm by negligence, committed by a recurring obligor; and reckless endangerment by omission, committed repeatedly.
According to the prosecutor’s ruling, the fire broke out approximately 500 meters from the village of Dafni in Lake Evia. Specifically, the initial ignition “was caused by sparks from a mechanical chainsaw used by one or more individuals engaged in illegal logging.” The sparks ignited the nearby dry vegetation, specifically pine needles, which led to the outbreak of the fire. However, it should be noted that the prosecutor’s investigation did not identify the person or persons responsible for the illegal logging that caused the fire.
The fire quickly grew to massive proportions due to several weather and climatic conditions: a prolonged heat wave, extremely low humidity, low fuel moisture, and atmospheric instability. Other factors contributing to the fire’s growth included the presence of huge amounts of dead and dry combustible material, such as fallen pines from an earlier storm, and the topography, including the edge of an inaccessible ravine with steep slopes.
According to the prosecutor’s ruling, four factors contributed to the extreme fire behavior. First, the fire broke out in a dense forest of old-growth pines, and the surrounding area was covered by thick vegetation. Additionally, Storm Medea’s advance in February 2021 caused significant damage to the pine forests, resulting in the accumulation of a large amount of combustible material.
The third factor was the area’s humidity, as well as the fact that two previous heat waves had created favorable conditions for the fire.
“These events contributed to an increase in available combustible material and its gradual drying, creating an explosive environment for extreme forest fires,” according to the prosecutor’s ruling.
Regarding the Fire Service’s management of the fire, the prosecutor found that, from August 3 to 8, 2021, the Fire Service “responded to a high volume of fire incidents” across multiple areas of the country, which resulted in a “dispersion of resources”. For the fire in Northern Evia, the prosecutor stated that dozens of vehicles, ground crews, and aerial units were mobilized from the beginning to suppress the fire. However, the prosecutor noted that “the fire’s unpredictable, rapid, and multidirectional spread made it impossible to position sufficient firefighting forces across the entire perimeter of the blaze.”
Regarding the potential liability of the relevant forestry services, the Chalcis Prosecutor’s Office concluded that “the funds allocated to the two forestry offices of Lake Evia and Istiaia for wildfire prevention projects were fully spent on maintaining and improving forest roads, clearing firebreaks in public forests, and maintaining and enhancing public forests.” However, as noted, “these funds applied only to the public forests within the jurisdiction of the two aforementioned forestry offices.” Storm Medea caused extensive damage to non-public forests, where “protection projects are the responsibility of the forest owner.” However, “due to a lack of funding for nonpublic forestry programs in recent years, wildfire prevention projects in these forests were minimal prior to 2021.”
The prosecutor’s ruling emphasizes that “logging within non-public forests, whether carried out under management plans or as emergency harvesting, was conducted only with the consent and willingness of the forest owner.”
“From all of the above, it is clear that the fire that broke out in Northern Evia in August 2021 was an extreme event. Due to the above-analyzed conditions, it quickly reached uncontrollable and unpredictable proportions. As a result, despite the mobilization of the state apparatus and the measures taken within the limits of the broader state plan for wildfire prevention and response in Greece, it could not be effectively managed,” the ruling notes.
Wildfire Prevention Projects
Of particular interest are the statements made to judicial and prosecutorial authorities by state officials who were called to provide explanations. Of particular interest are the written statements of a forester who served at the Lake Evia Forestry Office at the time.
He provided detailed information on the funds allocated to the office from 2018 through 2021, as well as the wildfire-prevention projects completed before the August 2021 fire. These projects included maintaining the forest road network, upkeeping firebreaks, maintaining water reservoirs, and clearing the forest. The total funds amounted to €353,000, €80,000 of which were allocated in 2021.
The forester outlined all of the wildfire prevention projects planned for 2021. These projects, which aim to restore damage to forests caused by wildfires, natural disasters, and catastrophic events, have a total value of €2.091 million. Specifically, the projects included restoring passability on the Retsinolakos–Kalamoudi forest road in the Lake Evia Forestry Office’s jurisdiction, costing €45,580; restoring damage to public Lake Evia forest roads due to wildfires and natural disasters, costing €372,000; protecting public forests from wildfires in the Lake Evia Forestry Office’s jurisdiction, costing €706,800; improving the Pili–Karya forest road in the Lake Evia Forestry Office area, costing €396,568; and improving the Platani Psili Rahi forest road in the same jurisdiction, costing €570,400.
However, as the forester noted, “the implementation of these projects had not begun by August 2021, not due to any fault of our service. In simple terms, the necessary measures for wildfire prevention had not been carried out.”
The head of the Lake Evia Forestry Office had also made the same point to the prosecutorial authorities.
“Because the Lake Evia Forestry Office area falls within the highest fire-risk zone, our service included wildfire prevention projects in the 2014–2020 Greek Rural Development Program (RDP), as shown in the table below. The implementation of these projects had not begun by August 2021, not due to any fault of our service,” the forester stated in testimony to the prosecutorial authorities.
The identity of those responsible for the failure to implement these projects remains unknown.
“We didn’t see any other aircraft that day”
Another significant piece of information is the “Final Report on Actions by the Evia Fire Directorate for the Fire Destruction File,” which was prepared by a Fire Service officer stationed in Evia. The report provides a detailed account of the actions taken by the Fire Service throughout the catastrophic fire. Noteworthy is the discussion of the aerial resources and how they operated, particularly regarding events on August 3, 2021, the day the fire broke out.
At around 5:09 p.m., as we were approaching Krieza, we received calls from the Chief of the Istiaia Fire Department and the Head of the Lake Fire Station. They reported a major forest fire outbreak in the Mourtia area of the Lake–Mantoudi–Agia Anna municipality. We immediately departed for the scene and requested reinforcements, including aerial units and vehicles, from neighboring Fire Departments via the Central Fire Coordination Center of Central Greece (see the relevant file). We also requested reinforcements from the Director of the Regional Fire Service of Central Greece. We also requested water-carrying vehicles and earth-moving equipment from the Evia Regional Fire Service, knowing that the terrain favors the spread of the fire,” the report notes, continuing with a further description:
Upon arriving at the scene approximately one hour and forty minutes after leaving Krieza, I observed that the fire had grown massive and was spreading rapidly. It had already burned over 7,000 stremmas. At the same time, a TRACTOR and an S-64 from ERICSSON arrived and operated for about twenty minutes before departing. Despite repeated calls from the Chief of the Istiaia Fire Department, they had no communication. No other aircraft were seen that day.
“There was a lack of coordination with the aerial resources”
The officer’s description is striking, both for the first hours of the fire and for his conclusions about the overall performance of the leased aerial units. He emphasized that “it was impossible to compile a report on the number and performance of the leased units” for four reasons. The first reason relates to the size of the fire, which “was enormous and made it impossible to monitor all aerial resources.” The second reason is the lack of communication between the aerial units and the ground coordinators.
“Most of the drop points and the number of drops are unknown, as the aerial units carried them out most of the time at their own discretion, without communicating with ground coordinators,” the report notes.
The third reason involves a “lack of coordination with the aerial units due to the Varibobi and Atalanti fires (involving the coordinators).” Additionally, “due to the dense smoke, we could not see the aerial units, and some of them, because of the low smoke cloud, approached the fire and then left without any communication.” In short, the Fire Service officer describes a chaotic situation among the aerial units. Despite these shocking testimonies from state officials, the Chalcis Prosecutor’s Office concluded that no responsible parties could be held accountable.
