- Why has the report remained under wraps since early last April? — Hellenic Train has been called in to provide explanations.
- The investigation into the fire resistance of seating materials in railway carriages began with an enormous delay, and only after pressure from the victims’ relatives.
- The RAS requested that Hellenic Train produce certificates of compliance, yet the certificates could not be found…
- “HT’s contracts with the maintenance subcontractors “TENNIS CRAFT INTERKAT” and “GLOBAL INTERIOR SYSTEMS IKE” do not explicitly state that the seat materials must include flame-retardant upholstery…”
By Aris Chatzigeorgiou
Trains in Greece continue to operate without official certification confirming the fire resistance of their seats. This is one of the key conclusions reached in a report by the Railway Regulatory Authority (RAS). Despite identifying specific violations, the report has remained “under seal” since early April.
The secrecy displayed by this supposedly independent authority is evident from the fact that, based on this report, Hellenic Train was summoned to a hearing on May 21, 2026, just a few days later, while RAS has not published any related decision, neither on Diavgeia nor on its official website. Meanwhile, a preliminary investigation is pending before the Athens Court of First Instance and it is unclear when Hellenic Train’s hearing will conclude or what further procedures may be required before RAS reaches a final ruling. All this is happening as we enter the fourth year since the Tempi tragedy, a crime that occurred while the relevant authorities ignored warning signs in the form of constant malfunctions, shortages and repeated alerts of an impending accident.
Today, Data Journalists reveal the violations identified in the RAS report, along with the evidence that led to its conclusions. The report’s wording is cautious and, in some sections, particularly complex given the issue’s technical nature and how easily the true scale of safety gaps in passenger rail operations can be obscured.
It should be noted that the investigation into the fire resistance of seating materials in railway carriages began with a conspicuous delay, following pressure from the victims’ relatives, led by the prominent lawyer Antonis Psaropoulos, whose daughter Martha lost her life in the tragic accident. These efforts intensified after audio recordings recovered from the victims’ mobile phones at the end of 2024 revealed that some of the victims had not died from the collision itself, but from the fire that broke out afterwards (“I have no oxygen”).
The official investigation into the seats began so late that the state agency EODASAAM had to issue a supplementary report in February 2026, a full year after its original findings were published. The initial report stated that samples had been taken from three different seats in two train carriages and sent to RST laboratories in Germany. “EODASAAM requested seat samples from the Investigating Appeals Judge of Larissa through a formal request. The samples were collected by the court-appointed expert witnesses of the Investigating Appeals Judge of Larissa, as detailed in the ‘Report on the Collection of Samples from the Seats of the Passenger Train IC-62’ (Larissa, 11 December 2024).” In short, the samples were collected in December 2024 and sent to the German RST laboratory in January 2025, just a few days before the original report was finalised.
“The tests in question could not be carried out before the publication of the Investigation Report. As a result, the issue of the seats’ fire resistance remained an unresolved matter requiring further examination,” states the supplementary report. However, it took the RST laboratory from January until August 25, 2025 to send its results to EODASAAM. As alleged at the time, payment from the Greek state to the German laboratory had been excessively delayed. Consequently, the case file was closed without including the findings from RST.
The Germans’ conclusions were made public in February 2026. According to their report, the seats failed to meet specifications — in other words, they were not sufficiently flame-retardant, but rather “kindling”, as investigator K. Lakafosis vividly described them during a presentation on behalf of the EDAPO team. Nevertheless, the supplementary report issued by EODASAAM three years after the Tempi disaster failed to answer the question of whether the seats in the rest of the railway fleet, the trains on which thousands of passengers continue to travel, comply with fire-resistance standards.
EODASAAM avoided answering the question and shifted responsibility elsewhere by issuing Recommendation 2025-RL01-018. “The purpose of this recommendation is to determine the fire resistance level of passenger carriage seats and address any identified safety risks,” it stated, calling on OSE (Sidirodromoi Ellados S.A.) and Hellenic Train S.A., under the supervision of RAS, “to inspect and document the fire resistance level of the seats in the passenger carriages leased by Hellenic Train S.A. from Sidirodromoi Ellados S.A., and manage any identified safety risks through the implementation of appropriate measures.”
Based on this recommendation and the formal legal notices sent by the victims’ relatives, RAS began drafting the report, which remains sealed to this day. In addition to exchanging information with those involved, RAS carried out a surprise inspection of the maintenance facilities operated by Hellenic Train in Thessaloniki. Although the rolling stock itself is held by OSE and ultimately owned by the Greek state, Hellenic Train is responsible for its maintenance. Notably, the surprise inspection by RAS took place in November 2025, well before the publication of the EODASAAM report. The inspection revealed the following:
- “The maintenance work carried out by HELLENIC TRAIN on its rolling stock concerning the replacement of seat upholstery materials in passenger carriages has not consistently complied with UIC Standard 564-2 over time. This standard is currently the applicable national rule and is registered in the ERA’s RDD database regarding the fire protection of rolling stock.”
- “No objective evidence was collected, despite it being requested, such as certificates from the supplier and manufacturer for the seat upholstery materials. These certificates should have accompanied the materials upon their delivery.”
It should be noted that the standard referred to, UIC 564-2, is not the one currently required for trains operating in Europe. Rather, it is the older standard that was in force in the 1990s when these particular trains were ordered. Today, the stricter EN 45545-2 standard applies. Although Greece had the authorisation and obligation to comply with the older standard, the investigation carried out by RST was conducted on the basis of the newer one. This could potentially create a legal loophole if the matter reaches a courtroom.
RAS therefore requested that Hellenic Train produce certificates demonstrating compliance with the older standard, which remains the applicable “national rule”. However, no such certificates were found. This absence is not recorded as a mere procedural omission, but as a violation.
“The Authority repeatedly requested that Hellenic Train submit certification proving that the fabric and materials used for seat maintenance comply with the UIC 564-2 standard. Although a letter from a subcontractor representative was provided, no material certificates were submitted. This finding was further confirmed during the surprise inspection at the Thessaloniki Workshop,” the report states.
Based on the above, the “Conclusions” section of the RAS report — excerpts of which are presented below — records the following specific violations:
- “Neither the compliance nor the consistency of compliance over time of the seat materials in passenger carriages, which are replaced as part of maintenance work carried out on HELLENIC TRAIN rolling stock, has been ensured or demonstrated. This is with regard to the essential parameter of “fire protection of rolling stock and evacuation” as set out in UIC Leaflet 564-2, which constitutes the currently applicable national rule registered in the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) Reference Document Database (RDD). More specifically, despite having been requested, no objective evidence was found, such as supplier and manufacturer certificates for the materials, which are required to accompany the seat upholstery upon delivery by subcontractors.”
“In cases where maintenance activities are subcontracted by the Entity in Charge of Maintenance at HT, no structured approach is followed to ensure these activities are managed properly and achieve the organisation’s objectives.” More specifically:
i.
HT’s contracts with the subcontractors TENNIS CRAFT INTERKAT and GLOBAL INTERIOR SYSTEMS IKE do not explicitly state that the seat materials must include flame-retardant upholstery in accordance with UIC 564-2, as set out in the original manufacturing contracts. Consequently, no clear and binding requirement is imposed on the subcontractors. Instead, the contracts merely include the vague clause that ‘…the fabric shall be of the same quality and colour as the original…’, which, from a fire-protection standpoint, is interpreted as meaning that repaired seats must use flame-retardant upholstery materials that comply with UIC 564-2.
ii.
Furthermore, unlike the contracts with “TENNIS CRAFT INTERKAT,” the contracts 2021153/21-12-2021 and 2022249/30-12-2022 between HT and “GLOBAL INTERIOR SYSTEMS IKE” do not contain a clause requiring the submission of material certificates. The contracts with “TENNIS CRAFT INTERKAT,” however, stipulate that: “…Upon delivery, if the supplier is not the manufacturer of the items, the products shall be accompanied by all manufacturer certificates of guarantee and authenticity.”
Although the situation described in the “Violations” section is presented in highly technical language, it points to an operator (Hellenic Train) that, despite being responsible for maintaining rolling stock carrying thousands of passengers, has failed to ensure the retention of the necessary certifications and has carried out repair work without guaranteeing compliance with specific safety requirements.
While all this is taking place, the responsible state authorities continue to let time pass and pay Hellenic Train the annual subsidy of €62 million without pressuring the company to implement compliance measures that would be considered self-evident in any other European country.
It is also worth recalling that, when the matter reached Parliament last March, Kostas Kyranakis, the Deputy Minister of Transport responsible for the sector, stated that the new trains he would bring would comply with the required standards. However, he claimed he could not know about the trains that arrived years earlier, “when he himself was three years old”…
