The shadows for the secret funds of the Armed Forces surveillance services.
Who gives the orders for the targets and who controls them?
An unexplored mystery
What emerged from the research in a nutshell:
A few weeks after the Androulakis surveillance was revealed and literally, in the shadow of the scandal, the Chief of HNDGS inaugurated the “Special Operations Force Intelligence Hub”.
In this way, he essentially bypassed the NIS and acquired an integrated surveillance system of his own. What was the reason for this need?
The “bugs” of the Armed Forces, the Coast Guard, and the Police not only exist and are used but are not subject to any control.
By the law of 1953, the surveillance is given permission and no one knows (nor the legal advisers of the Ministry of National Defence) whether the law is respected.
A scene of chaos prevails both with the “informants” and the money they receive. Maybe the NIS is the smallest problem compared to others…
by Paris Karvounopoulos
The Minister’s adviser read with great concern the ‘intelligence report’ that had been forwarded to him. “Information” emanating from “hearings of a uniformed bug”, but also from whistleblowers of doubtful credibility. The consultant’s concern was twofold: should he have presented his minister with this information, which spoke of a “national threat” without any tangible evidence? The second part of his reflections was “how much did this information cost” paid for by the infamous secret funds”?
The story is not imaginary and has not happened only once to a “ministerial advisor”. One of them, Demosthenis Bakopoulos, with a mandate in the Ministries of National Defence and Shipping, talks to the Data Journalists about what he experienced and knows about the “dark world” of “uniformed bugs”!
It is not only the NIS and the “private individuals” who have been busy with research and current affairs in recent months. There are other “bugs” that the state machine can use. Bugs that are essentially not subject to any control and their use is not governed by any institutional framework! That is why it is perhaps the most dangerous category of “bugs”.
Demosthenes Bakopoulos is a lawyer. From March 2008 until October 2009 he served in the office of the legal advisor of the Hellenic Air Force General Staff and subsequently until June 2012 he was a legal advisor to the Office of the Minister of National Defence. From 2015 to 2017 he was an advisor to the Minister of the Marine who is responsible for the Coast Guard. He’s a lecturer at the Air Force Academy. A common point of the ministries of defense and shipping to which he served is that they both have their own “bugs”. Even if the Ministry of the Environment is secretive about the issue of its “technological monitoring capabilities”, in the Ministry of the Marine, the “superbug” of the Coast Guard has often been advertised after successful operations. The same applies to the “superbug” of the Greek Police. The MoND’s intelligence capabilities are described in the structure of the Joint Military Intelligence Directorate.
The interesting thing about Demosthenes Bakopoulos’ approach to the operation of “uniformed bugs” is that it connects them directly with the notorious “secret funds” that exist in the ministries that have “under their control” monitoring systems. Or who they think they’re controlling, as he says.
“Do you know under which law the Chiefs of Police and Coast Guard can secretly manage funds for “national security information”? It’s the law of 1953! Back when the state was chasing the “inner enemy”, after the Civil War. Since 1953, how many governments have passed? Which one of them changed that law? Only Kotzias went to change the situation with the secret funds and was expelled, ” says Dimosthenis Bakopoulos.
What is the connection between surveillance by “uniformed bugs” and secret funds? Having lived the reality within two ministries that had both secret funds and “information from monitoring systems”, Dimosthenis Bakopoulos describes:
“What are the secret funds? A three-member committee consisting of officers who take orders and have a duty to execute them certifies that expenditure disbursed by each Chief to collect information is legal. It’s probably the fastest ten grand in Greece. Faster than ATM withdrawals! I have often asked the question: has it ever been checked whether this money is going where it is told? Is it possible for us to be satisfied that a three-member committee composed of low-ranking officers confirms, say, that a lady has given us a tip about the whereabouts of a fugitive? Even worse when it comes to national security issues. Can we just accept the information of any unknown source that “Turkish action” is imminent and have to decide whether to alert the country’s Armed Forces? All this because on a paper it is stated that some lady met someone who happened to know someone else, who somehow had something to do with the environment of a Turkish general and so we learned that maybe there would be a Turkish action”? The events are not imaginary, they have happened.
Along with the informants operate the “uniformed bugs”. How are they working? Who are they watching? Who controls them? Who’s going to answer to whom if something turns out to be illegal? The issue is huge, as Dimosthenis Bakopoulos points out:
“At the moment we have a preliminary examination going on which concerns how the surveillance is done. We deal with surveillance by the NIS, for which there is at least an institutional framework in theory. It’s being observed or not being observed, like it or not, but it’s there. Can anyone tell us what is the institutional framework under which the “machines” held by the Ministry of National Defence or the Ministry of Maritime Affairs operate, where simply the Chief of Coast Guard can order the interception of a telephone? In other words, he assigns a subordinate, who must carry out his mandate, a follow-up that has not been approved in substance within an institutional framework ensuring that there are good reasons for doing so.
There are other issues: where do the “recordings” end up? I’m asking because I can say in public, but I won’t reveal names, because they have to do with my legal capacity, I’ve talked to people who were the victims of such surveillance.
There is also another question: who sold these machines, and how did they sell them in Greece? As they were apparently sold to private individuals. But as far as government agencies are concerned, who has certified and licensed them? Are they registered in a National Registry”?
Demosthenes Bakopoulos is not against the use of surveillance systems as an anti-criminal tool. Far from it:
“I am the first to say that such surveillance systems are indeed tools of criminal policy so that you can monitor the barons of crime, the ones who launder money, and the ones who sell drugs. But this story cannot be involved with irrelevant things and intertwined with the way state money moves through secret funds. They are two parallel problems that no government of any ideology has had the courage to touch. Because of work I have found myself at the point where I was opening the information bulletin this morning and said that some lady met with a “source” who the previous night was drinking with the Turk General and was informed that the Turks would invade. I am joking, but it is not far from the reality that I had to deal with. What do you say to the minister? That the country should be put on red alert by a piece of information paid several thousand euros and its credibility is zero? So the point is not to turn National Defense and Security into something else that serves any other purpose than National Defense and Security.”
What’s the solution?
“A serious, reliable service that will take on with a clear institutional framework the monitoring that needs to be done. Is it possible that in Greece, each agency has its own monitoring equipment? In addition to wasting money, it is also ineffective. Let them upgrade the NIS after solving the many problems it drags from the past, let them create a “concrete” process for the surveillance in which the Ministry of Justice will have a more substantial role, and let us let our patents have their own bug,” says Dimosthenis Bakopoulos.
“I am happy to inform Mr. Doyakos”
The lawyer Dimosthenis Bakopoulos states that he would be happy to inform the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court Isidoros Doyakos about all this: “I have met many times as a lawyer defender with Mr. Doyakos. He owns legal science and the Penal Code. I’m happy to testify to what I know and told you. Let him call me and I will rush to inform him about everything I know and lived,” he concludes:
“There are indeed issues where personal data subsides because it serves the defense and security of a country, but there are issues when we raise the tones for defense and security because we want to serve other purposes. In Greece, society has received the most often occurring latter and because it has no way to fight it, for this reason, it has simply put its back to the wall.
Excuse me, but this society is a society living in a state of freedom and that is an obstacle to progress. To clarify what National Defense and Security are. It would not take much to do. Science has defined them.”
In support of what Mr. Bakopoulos told the Data Journalists, it is what has happened in recent months. The “Joint Intelligence Service” and even the NIS seem not to have been enough to meet the “information needs” of the “newly established Special War Command” of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff. This is why at the same time that the scandal of interceptions was raging in Greece with the revelation of the monitoring of the president of PASOK-KINAL Nikos Androulakis, the General Staff of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff Kostas Floros inaugurated the new “Intelligence Fusion Cell” (IFC), “which strengthens the capabilities of the newly established Special War Command of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff throughout its mission”. The ceremony took place on September 19th, literally in the shadow of the wiretapping scandal.
The Chief of HNDGS then referred to “the contribution of the new Special Operations Force Intelligence Hub to the search, collection, processing, and distribution of information as well as to their operational exploitation. He also stressed that the new Information Hub is now an organic part of the ISP, while its new facilities with the upgraded equipment and the high-security standards, reinforce the mission of this and its units”.
Let’s see first of all what is this famous “Special War Command”.
Honorary General Constantine Ginis is a respected person in the Armed Forces and his view can hardly be questioned. He has served in extremely critical positions not only within borders but also outside. Highly classified NATO positions. He does not “mince his words” when asked about the Special War Command and its usefulness.
“It was presented as the ultimate solution to the problems in the Aegean. I have grave reservations about both the structure and the way in which these forces will be used. I think the Special War Command, as it is structured, cannot replace the role of the Army. Anyone who thinks this is making a huge mistake,” he says with obvious concern.
Simply put, the Special Forces became fully autonomous in the spring of 2021. Now they also acquire their own “secret service”, the KOMVOS, which according to what has been stated by the Chief of HNDGS is staffed “with specialized personnel from both the Armed Forces and the Hellenic Police, the Hellenic Coast Guard and the National Intelligence Service (NIS), giving it not only interdisciplinary but also interdepartmental character”.
Exactly what ‘information gap’ will the KOMVOS not previously covered by the NIS fill? Who will he be able to monitor and with whose approval? It will report directly to the Chief of HNDGS, i.e. not even to the political leadership of the Ministry of National Defence. What was the need for another “bug in uniform”? Is this all normal?
Concentrating so many forces and capabilities on one person should at least provoke skepticism. The investigation is continuing…
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