- “Armaments dump” and “guinea pig” the country for decades
- Billions were wasted and weapons systems that were advertised as the “shield of the country” became pigeon houses.
- Weapon systems are purchased without any provision for maintenance and are grounded in disuse immediately upon receipt
- The Slovakian artillery that Akis bought did not find a target (Revealing documents)
- The useless and extremely expensive Zubr fast transport vessels that sailed only with winds up to 4 beaufort
- 12 C-27 transport aircrafts, out of which only one flies
- How Andreas Papandreou and Kostas Simitis changed their minds on arms purchases at the last minute
- Problems with the F-35s advertised by the current government
by Paris Karvounopoulos
The history of Greek armaments for at least the last 40 years is full of myths. It would not be a problem if geography had placed us in another “corner” of the planet with neighbors Luxembourg or the Netherlands. But with an existing military threat called Turkey facing us, games and experiments with armaments are not acceptable.
Moreover, it is inconceivable how the governments of these 40 years did not respect properly those who paid billions (in drachmas and euros) to buy weapons, supposedly for the security of the country. The addition of the billions thrown out of the window for useless or unnecessary weapons cannot but arouse the wrath of those who pay. In other words, the Greek taxpayers…
Myth # 1: Governments listen to the recommendations of the military before deciding on arms purchases. Every time the politicians involved in armaments were cornered, they threw the ball at the military. How true is that?
In August 1981, a few weeks before the government change that brought PASOK to power, the Supreme Air Council submitted the proposal for the modernization of the Air Force for the next decade. The proposal, entitled “Identity of a new fighter aircraft”, is signed by the head of the Operational Requirements Department of the Hellenic Air Force General Staff, Grigoris Nousias, and is about the purchase of 120 fighter aircraft of a single type and of a dual role. The aim was to address the big problem of the many types of aircrafts that the Air Force had at that time and caused many problems, mainly in their support.
Anyone who read the recommendation of the Air Marshals understood that the aircraft they proposed was the American F-18 of Boeing, an aircraft carrier, which was suitable for its use by the Greek Air Force (AF) in the many “land aircraft carriers” of the Aegean, i.e. the islands.
Three years later, with PASOK in power, the decision to strengthen the AF provides for the purchase of two types of aircrafts. It is the well-known Purchase of the Century. The aircrafts selected are Lockheed Martin’s F-16, which since 1948 have been something of a national supplier to us, and France’s Dassault’s Mirage 2000.
Andreas Papandreou’s decision to split the market in two is criticized and justified on the grounds that he did not want the Air Force to depend solely on the Americans.
Several years later, of course, Papandreou’s choice will be vindicated in a historic and tragic moment for the country. On the night of Imia on January 30, 1996, Greek and Turkish F-16s remain grounded at airports… due to weather conditions. They normally only carry out missions of the aging F-4E Phantom II and the French Mirage 2000 chosen by Papandreou.
After that, everyone would expect that in the next “purchase of the century” Greece would be more cautious and more demanding. In 1999, with the Simitis government, it is time for another huge purchase. In the last KYSEA, everyone knew that Greece is turning a page and chooses to buy the F-15 fighter aircraft from the American Boeing. An aircraft that can carry huge quantities of weapons and comfortably covers Cyprus as well. In addition, there was also the inability of the F-16 to fly the one and only time we needed it.
The KYSEA under the presidency of Simitis and to the general surprise of all the ministers who participated and were informed about the purchase of the F-15 heard from the prime minister that Greece will buy another 60 F-16s because otherwise, the Turks would make a fuss in the Aegean!
In 2005, the Karamanlis government bought 30 more F-16s, although airmen said at the time that Greece would have to buy a 4th or 5th generation aircraft. Among the aircrafts proposed was the Rafale…
This is enough to dispel the myth that all arms purchases were made on the basis of recommendations from the military… Military leaders over the years “adapted”, and the suggestions they asked for including what they believed and what they knew their political superiors wanted to buy.
Armaments diplomacy
The term “armament diplomacy” was invented during the period of purchases made after Imia, under the premiership of Simitis, with Akis Tsochatzopoulos as the Minister of National Defence. The billions of arms purchases were also supposedly used as “tolls” for the great goal of Greece’s entry into the EMU, but also for Cyprus’ accession to the EU.
At that time, Greece had entered the international “equipment supermarket” and bought what was given to it. The scandals and bribes uncovered were the biggest issues that emerged from those markets. But there were other consequences, some of which we still pay for today.
Weapon systems of many hundreds of millions were paid for and even today cannot be used. The main reason is that everything was bought without any support agreements.
The most characteristic examples:
C-27 transport aircrafts
The C-27 transport program is timely. One of these aircrafts was constantly flying to transport from Djibouti, Greek citizens who had been evacuated from the torn Sudan. It was one of two C-27s currently flying. We had ordered 12, we received 8, one flies and sometimes two.
What’s their story?
The AF had requested in 1999 15 Medium Capacity aircrafts, which would be able to carry out more than 70% of C-130 missions, reducing the resulting operating costs by 80%. By the decision of KYSEA on March 1, 2001, the number undersupply was reduced to 12 aircrafts.
On January 29, 2003, a $272,720,603 contract was signed with Lockheed Martin Alenia Tactical Transport Systems to supply 12 C-27J Spartan aircrafts. The 8 in their basic configuration and the 4 with the possibility of aerial refueling.
With very long delays, in July 2011 we received the 8 C-27s and paid $198,594,721. Aircraft support problems prevented them from flying. On July 26, 2012, KYSEA decided to cancel the delivery of the last four aircrafts that would be able to be refueled by air. The reason was that the manufacturer could not certify the air refueling system. Instead of asking for compensation, we accepted not to receive the aircraft and the rest of the money to be converted into technical support for the 8 aircrafts.
By decision of KYSEA on April 26, 2012, the receipt of the last 4 A/Fs was canceled, for which the manufacturer demonstrated a prolonged failure to certify the in-flight refueling system (IFRS), allowing offsetting of the remaining payments and other claims of the Greek State. The result of the deal was disappointing and the availability never reached the levels required for an AF like the Greek one. They soon fell into the dyad.
The Corruption Prosecutor’s Office had opened an investigation into the agreement to cancel the delivery of the last four aircrafts. Only the investigation was limited to military personnel involved in the deal. The result is that taxpayers paid nearly $200 million and the AF has no means of transport.
The problem is exacerbated by the dramatic situation in the C-130 fleet. Availability is still …lower. Once a C-130 transport aircraft flies and the problem of supporting and maintaining them is now intractable, since the current government has chosen, instead of trusting the state-run HAI, to distribute technical work to private companies that have so far achieved absolutely nothing.
Konstantinos Frangos, a retired officer, was director of the office of the Minister of National Defence Yiannis Charalambopoulos. After his retirement, he writes regularly and is a military analyst. He talks about the Greek “armaments madhouse” on the occasion of the availability of transport aircrafts of the AF. It also refers to a series of unjustified mistakes and decisions.
ZUZANA firearms
The story of the ZUZANA guns would have been a joke if it hadn’t cost u as much as it did. It is perhaps the most indicative case of our armaments circus.
It is the story of the Slovakian artillery that Akis Tsochatzopoulos bought, completely ignoring all the negative suggestions of the military. And when the Army General Staff refused to receive them and incorporate them into the military force, Tsochatzopoulos sent them to Cyprus.
In January 1998 Akis Tsochatzopoulos travels to Slovakia. A demonstration of an experimental gun has been arranged that not even the Slovak army had supplied. It’s the famous Zuzana.
For this reason, Sbokos, head of the General Directorate of Armaments, with a document asked the General Staff to participate in the trip and two artillery officers. The General Staff, although it had not expressed any desire to procure artillery, sent the two officers.
The show in Slovakia was an unrepeatable fiasco. The documents are from the assessment made by the officers. Demonstration shots… failed to happen.
In fact, they say:
“…Two missiles were fired at a target at a distance of 500 meters unsuccessfully. Then the procedure was repeated where three more projectiles were fired, resulting in the target being fired from the last (third) projectile.”
Other shots had the same fate. They failed.
The officers write:
“The first shot was fired at a range of 14,700 m. Of the projected four projectiles, only two were fired due to a firearm failure that could not be repaired in the field… The two projectiles fired, which had to be fired at the same point, diverged in a direction of 150 m and a range of 200 m beyond the target.”
In addition, all of his “sight” instruments were designed and constructed with data from the Warsaw Pact.
But Tsochatzopoulos and Sbokos insist. On 21/11/1998 the second committee goes for evaluation. The results are worse.
The Army Chief of Staff Konstantinos Panagiotakis, in order to get out of the difficult position with his document, asks:
- To co-assess this gun with others of the same category in terms of cost-effectiveness
- To examine the necessity-feasibility of modernizing existing firearms to acquire characteristics similar to those of the new generation. So he was saying straight up, don’t throw away money.
And yet the purchase of 12 guns was made at a cost of $30 million.
However, the Zuzana firearms were never received by the Greek army. “Utilizing” the still alive Unified Defense Doctrine of Greece-Cyprus, Akis, and Sbokos send them to Cyprus… for its defense. They were never used.
Fast transport vessels for lakes in the Aegean
Equally interesting is the case of the supply of four fast transport vessels purchased from Russia and Ukraine. These are the famous Zubr that cost 67 billion drachmas at 2000 prices, although it was known that they could operate up to 4 Beaufort. A condition that in the Aegean is rare. The Zubr were designed and built for the needs of the Russian and Ukrainian Armed Forces that have absolutely nothing to do with the Aegean…
The armament stories of that time are many. All of them have been revealed, and many of them have been brought to justice, but no one believes that everything has come to light and all those responsible have paid. But the worst part is that, as it turns out, we haven’t learned anything.
Recurring errors
Repeated mistakes cease to be mistakes. After a long period of disarmament that began in 2006 – before the memoranda – the country’s so-called rearmament began in 2018, with the decision to modernize 83 F-16 fighter jets in the Viper version. The deal was announced during Tsipras’ trip to the United States, where he met with then-President Trump.
Very soon it became known that the modernization program would have to deal with a very serious problem. The US Air Force warned the Greek government that the modern AESA radar, which would enter the Greek F-16s, would not be able to cooperate with the ASPIS self-protection system.
Here is the document:
Syriza has left, ND has also come and is advertising the modernization of the 2 billion but no one has yet answered what is happening with the planes. Two Viper F-16s have been delivered. Is their radar working with the self-protection system? The answer is …confidential. The information says that in order to fix the problem there is a solution: to dismantle the self-protection system and place a new one. What about the cost? 450,000,000 and counting.
The current government has made armaments a priority. The purchases of Rafale and Belharra frigates were seen as very positive steps, but there are issues that are not sufficiently explained.
The first has to do with the maintenance of the Rafale. Is it guaranteed? Will they have the fate of the Mirage 2000 or even the C-27? Is it possible that aircraft costing close to 3 billion euros will come to an “interim solution” until the F-35’s “dream” is fulfilled?
In addition, there is the huge issue of the exclusion of the Greek defense industry from the two French programs. In the Rafale, Greek participation is non-existent, and in the French frigates… symbolic. Greece’s $15 billion Euro in armaments, secured nothing but crumbs for its defense industry and it is obvious that such an opportunity will not be easily given again.
However, on the occasion of the slogan “rearming the country”, the government and the Hellenic National Defence General Staff have engaged in a barrage of supplies of used material, mainly from the USA, which is not only free, as it is presented, but costs us a lot of money. Needless to say, part of this material is unnecessary.
Indicative is the purchase of used amphibious vehicles that the Hellenic National Defence General Staff wants to do from the USA. AAVs have been involved in a fatal accident in the US in 2020 and that’s why the Americans are withdrawing them. Apart from that, the $268,000,000 amphibians do not fit in the tanks – they come in and out with difficulty – and are “overweight” for the catapults of the Navy’s tanks! How overweight? Just nine tons.
That is not all. While Greek taxpayers have paid 680 million for NH-90 transport helicopters that do not fly due to maintenance problems, the government is discussing buying American Black Hawk transport helicopters at a cost of 1.3 billion euros. There is no answer to what we are going to do with the 680 million helicopters that are in the box.
The way the purchases continue to be made is deeply troubling and the former head of the General Armaments Directorate Vice Admiral Kyriakos Kyriakides describes the situation:
Preference for the F-35
The Mitsotakis government officially says that in the last three years, it has brought the country’s defense spending to 15 billion euros. And we’re not done yet. According to the information available, before the elections, the Americans will announce that they will sell us F-35 aircraft. Purchase costs will range from $4 billion to $8 billion, depending on how many aircrafts we buy. However, this has not yet been clarified. The purchase of the F-35 is currently being treated as a pre-election firework. Operations will be taken care of later. And these operations are very serious.
Air Force Major General Dimitris Pantelatos, F-4 Phantom and F-16 pilot speak out about the “F-35 program”. “The F-35 is not a weapon,” he said.
Stefanos Karavidas is more revealing. One of the Air Force’s leading F-16 pilots, he is currently an overseas instructor. He confirms what sounded like a legend. The F-35 will not be an aircraft that can fight against Turkey if the owners of its data, the Americans, don’t allow it.
The history of armaments in Greece was and unfortunately remains painful. Billions have been spent and continue to be spent, it seems, without planning. That’s why every time a mammoth armament program is completed, we discover that we still have serious weaknesses in our defense.
If Greece and its governments had taken advantage of the billions we paid for arms properly, the country would have been armed like a lobster.
Instead, we find that the country’s defense apparatus is still operating with patches and the worst is that there is no attempt to “resurrect” the once promising Greek defense industry.
Billions of arms have been and are still being used as “security assistance” to our powerful “allies.”
But even that has not worked in any way. The last proof is the statements of the American Ambassador to Athens George Tsounis that in the Aegean no one – that is, Greece – has infallibility. These statements come at the same time that Greece willingly “unloads” from the Americans useless war material and almost begs to sell it an airplane that it will not be able to use against its main opponent…
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