- Why were the suggestions for the transfer of helicopters of the Armed Forces from Attica to Larissa ignored, in order to be close to the area where the forecasts indicated that the storm would hit.
- The helicopters that took off from bases in Attica failed to “navigate through” the storm and had to abort their missions twice.
- Out of the 12 Super Puma helicopters, only two were operational, out of the 15 C-130s that fly on “good days,” only two, one or two out of the eight C-27 Spartan transport aircraft, while the situation with the Chinook transport helicopters was equally disappointing.
By Paris Karvounopoulos
Deucalion, son of Prometheus, reigned in Thessaly. Only he, his wife Pyrrha, and his daughter Epimetheus were saved from the flood that destroyed everything in Thessaly. It is unknown why, in the emergency response plan drawn up in 2010 by the later Lieutenant General Lambros Tzoumis, the name of the King of Thessaly who was saved from drowning was given. In 2023 Deucalion was “defeated” by a new cataclysm which we had named Daniel.
What happened to the Armed Forces in the deadly weather? Had their assistance been requested in time? That is one question.
The second is why critical bases such as the one in Stefanovikio were so badly damaged. The base of the 1st Army Aviation Brigade literally sank.
The third has to do with the frighteningly low availability of flying assets of the Armed Forces. What is happening?
Was the activation of the Armed Forces requested in time?
Deucalion was not defeated by Daniel in battle. The Deucalion plan -which under Kostarakos’ leadership was incorporated into the XENOCRATES plan- was not activated and this was because it was judged by both the Civil Protection and the General Staff that the means that would be ready to intervene were sufficient. The Chiefs of Defence say that “what was requested by the Civil Protection may have been more than what was foreseen in the Deucalion plan”.
What were the predictions outlined in the Deucalion plan?
- Participation of all 3 branches of the Armed Forces, with the aim of assisting the Civil Protection forces in emergency situations within the country, as well as the forces of international organizations in the context of the country’s contribution abroad.
- The participating military units are composed only of permanent personnel from special units equipped with snow plows, dog rescuers, and scavenging firefighters, to deal with all kinds of disasters.
- Specific areas of responsibility and intervention priorities of the teams are defined.
The missions that the Deucalion forces can undertake include:
- – Supporting fire brigades in dealing with floods, earthquakes, fires, snowfalls, etc.
- – Assist the affected population with materials, food, and resources as well as health support where possible.
- – Assist in the evacuation of the population from affected areas.
- – Assist with the provision of machinery and equipment for the rehabilitation of the road network, restoring access to road bridges, etc.
After the drafting of the Deucalion plan, special training of military units was carried out by the fire brigade. These sections were equipped with appropriate means and materials, depending on the mission they were to perform (uniforms, fire-fighting boots, chainsaws, shovels, etc.).
This plan was not activated, even though the meteorologists’ forecasts were timely and, unfortunately, proved to be accurate and precise both in terms of the intensity of the bad weather and the areas to be affected. Plan Deucalion could have been activated before the deadly storm even began.
If the decision not to use the Deucalion forces is the responsibility of Civil Protection, there were major mistakes by the military leadership that caused problems in dealing with the weather once it broke out.
Staff had recommended the transfer of Armed Forces helicopters from Attica to Larissa so that they would be close to the area where forecasts indicated the storm would hit. The suggestions were ignored with unconvincing excuses.
One of them was that “we cannot withdraw the Super Puma stationed in Rhodes, because that would leave the Aegean exposed”. Except that two days ago they had no problem withdrawing the helicopter to bring it to Tanagra and fly it in a private air show.
As a result, as soon as the storm broke out, the helicopters that took off from Attica bases were unable to “navigate through” the weather, aborted their missions twice, and started to make rescues from noon onwards.
And while the state machine seemed unable to coordinate and use whatever capabilities it had to stem the destructive fury of the bad weather; Daniel began to sweep the Armed Forces as well.
Daniel swept through one of the most critical bases of the Armed Forces. Stepanovikio, where old UH-1H helicopters and state-of-the-art Apache attack helicopters were found … swimming on the flooded runway.
And that wasn’t the worst thing that happened. Even the shelters where Apaches were being serviced were flooded. The same thing happened to spare parts depots and within a few hours, Stefanovikio was literally drowned and “wiped” from the operational map of the Armed Forces. At the same time that the government was trying to convince that “there is no problem” and that the helicopters that were “splashing around” were “decommissioned”, Stefanovikio was flooding. All the helicopters, some flying and some on trucks, were transported to Larissa.
What was left of the base at Stefanovikio? The answer is in the video:
But the most serious issue that emerged from the involvement of the Armed Forces in the response to the bad weather Daniel was the confirmation of the dramatically low availability of air assets.
It turned out that out of the 12 Super Puma helicopters, only two were operational. And that’s not the only problem. Of the 15 C-130s that fly on “good days”, only two, one or two out of the eight C-27 Spartan transport aircraft, while the situation with the Chinook transport helicopters is equally disappointing.
The devaluation of the Hellenic Aerospace Industry and the disastrous outsourcing of maintenance to private operators
What is happening with the maintenance of the air assets of the Armed Forces? The tragic situation in their maintenance is linked to the long-term obsolescence of the Hellenic Aircraft Industry. The entry of private parties into the maintenance of transport aircraft and helicopters on the grounds that “the Hellenic Aerospace Industry cannot be consistent in its deliveries” does not seem to have worked out well at all.
No one has thought to correct what needs to be corrected in HAI, a company where over the years the composition of its staff has changed from 70% technicians-30% administrative staff to the opposite. Its experienced technicians left either because they were recruited by the world’s largest aerospace companies or because they retired.
“Instead of replacing them to ensure that the company continues to have well-trained personnel, the solution of hiring private individuals was chosen as the most “efficient” and “cost-effective” option.”
Let’s see the results in numbers:
- C-130- The cost of major maintenance at the Hellenic Aerospace Industry is 1.7 million euros, at 65 euros per man-hour. The maintenance was given to a private company (AMS), which uses the HAI facilities, and for 13 operations on the aircraft – not full maintenance – charges 1.1 million euros at 58 euros per man-hour. The workers have complained that it does not have the necessary certifications.
- Super Puma helicopter: HAI charges €1,000,000 for full maintenance. In Spain, where a helicopter has been sent, the cost is €3,000,000, and in Switzerland, at the RUAG company, where helicopters have also been sent, the cost is €8,000,000.
- Canadair CL215 and CL415 full maintenance at HAI costs €1,500,000. In France, at the Sabena company, where they have sent aircraft, the cost is €2,500,000, including training by Greek technicians and without damage coverage. In other words, the cost will greatly exceed €2,500,000.
To these, we should add that a private company, Apella, is active within the HAI to assist in F16 programs. In the three years they have been in the HAI they have claimed 12 million euros.
The president of the employees of HAI, Nikos Kapiris, describes the situation and what he says largely explains the major problems that the country’s Armed Forces face with the maintenance of their air assets.
Below is his description of the situation:
“Every recruitment that has taken place in HAI for the past eight years has been for the purpose of staffing the production departments where LM is involved. Every investment in building facilities, purchase of equipment, maintenance, or improvement has been exclusively related to these specific programs: F-16 & C-130J construction, P-3 & F-16 Viper upgrade.
Any order for aircraft equipment and the related reimbursements shall be given absolute priority as far as they relate to these projects. However, for the other activities that affect the effectiveness of the Armed Forces, and especially our Air Force, unfortunately, the same does not apply. All of these have been relegated to a secondary priority. A mentality that borders on treason. Or have those limits been crossed?
The end justifies the means and so it was necessary, through summary and illegal procedures, to wean the country’s armed forces from the HAI. And in order to do this, without provoking the media and public opinion, the company would first have to be artfully discredited, so that it could be vilified and appear in the eyes of public opinion as just another problematic state-owned enterprise, ruining the people’s money.
Thus, after creating a suitable climate and without any relevant reports from the mainstream media, the government handed over the task of maintaining the Air Force’s aircraft to competing private companies, both domestic and foreign…
The usual excuse: “There were reasons of national emergency.”
But really, what is the price of this policy for the Greek taxpayer?
The figures are revealing:
Programmed Depot Maintenance for a C-130 transport aircraft at HAI cost around €1.7 million, at a charge of €65/working hour. (Let there be no misunderstanding about the technicians’ salary. This ranges from €34 to €48, per day, depending on years of service). PDM means complete disassembly, inspection, repair, and restoration of the entire aircraft and its components.
On the other hand, the government has seen an interest in “giving away” part of the C-130 program to the private company AMS. We are talking about a company owned by a retired military officer, which has undertaken to carry out just 13 specific tasks, without the necessary certification and at a cost of €58/working hour and €1.1 million/aircraft.
Not for PDM maintenance, but for 13 tasks. The rest will still be done by the HAI… Two other C-130s have been forwarded to the Portuguese equivalent of the HAI, the well-known Ogma. The cost of restoration and delivery time, have not been estimated.
Complete PDM Super Puma. The cost to the HAI is around 1 million euros. Initially, they were forwarded to a Spanish company, where each helicopter reached and exceeded 3 million euros. Now and with the decision of another hasty award, the state has sent two to the Swiss Ruag, because there the maintenance is more expensive… 8 million euros for each helicopter.
Some were also “donated” to a Greek private company, whose certification for service was removed by the Super Puma manufacturer, Airbus Helicopters…
The firefighting aircraft
Let’s talk about the valuable firefighting CL-214 & 415 aircraft. The cost of PDM maintenance at EAB is 1.5 million euros. In the summer, the government sent one of each type to French Sabena, at a cost of 2.5 million euros/aircraft. The “package”, however, does not include the remediation of findings from the inspections, nor does it include the repair of faults.
An agreement concerning aircraft from half a century ago… Obviously, the actual cost will exceed 2.5 million euros. And the icing on the cake… A group of French technicians secretly visited the facilities of the 112 Air Training Wing, where a unit of HAI operates during the fire season, in order to be trained by HAI personnel. Apparently, they encountered some difficulties…
EUR 12 million to a company without a contract!
Finally, it is worth mentioning that for the last three years, 150 people have been working by government decision within HAI for the private company of Greek interests, Apella. They “support” productively the manufacturing program of the F-16 parts and perform management duties (!) in the Viper upgrade program, while being trained by the EAV itself… For these three years, Apella claims to receive 12 million euros from the state-owned company, without a signed contract in force.
Taking into account the above-mentioned reports and the tangible financial figures, let every thoughtful Greek judge whether there is reason behind all those sacrifices of the state-owned HAI, in the name of private interests and the establishment of ephemeral and vulnerable alliances.
The above alone highlights the role of the company as a means of preventing the escape of valuable foreign currency from the country, as well as providing quality services to the armed forces of our country.
There is a huge difference in costs and the work produced between a profit-driven company and another founded out of a sense of patriotism.
In the end, history will pass its verdict on the leaders, some referred to as “patriots” while others may be labeled as “auctioneers,” based on the decisions they made, both right and wrong.”
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