- Shocking revelation: “In Greece, it appears that there is no one at the government level or within the national authority who effectively assumes overall responsibility for railway safety and leads the system towards continuous improvement.”
- The ERA assessment team did not find a single “annual safety plan” at the national level, and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation shifted the blame to the Railway Regulatory Authority (RRA).
- National humiliation: The answers given by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation were rejected by the ERA!
- Why the comprehensive findings are not officially released, despite requests from MEPs and criticism of transparency.
By Aris Hatzigeorgiou
Ten strong blows for Greece are included in the comprehensive findings of the European Railway Agency (ERA), compiled in the aftermath of the Tempi incident last October, but remain sealed secrets amid negotiations between the government and the Commission.
The first report of the ERA experts, invited after the tragic accident to assess Greece’s compliance with European railway safety directives, was completed in September after visits and interviews with officials. One of their main findings is summarized in the following statement: “In Greece, it appears that there is no one at the government level or within the national authority who effectively takes overall responsibility for railway safety and leads the system towards continuous improvement.
At the time, the government cited “confidentiality” and an incomplete document, and promised to provide “appropriate responses”. The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation responded, but as revealed by Data Journalists, ten of them were rejected by the ERA.
In the comprehensive report, which was not officially released despite requests from members of the European Parliament and criticism of transparency, but is now included in the case file, the first 23 pages consist of the findings of the Europeans, followed by 20 pages of Greece’s responses. Meanwhile, the main critical comments – along with a few positive remarks and others calling for corrections – span 30 pages. Here are the ten points of rejection, along with relevant excerpts from the text of the Conclusions:
1 – TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY
ERA disagrees with the Greek government’s transfer of responsibility for safety to the Railway Regulatory Authority (RRA) and has been writing since September that this transfer is not in line with the Railway Safety Directive (RSD) 2016/798. This transfer of responsibility was not done by accident but with the obvious aim of relieving the Ministry and protecting it from malpractice. It is noteworthy that the fateful K. Ach. Karamanlis claimed that he was unaware of the safety gaps because he had not been informed by the RRA.
In their response, the Ministry officials deny the allegation. They say that the delegation of responsibility to the RRA was carried out with Law 4632 (shortly after the New Democracy party took office in October 2019), following Directive 2016/798, and that the RRA “as an independent authority is part of the legal entities of the state, including in the central administration of Greece, and additionally has expertise and experience in the railway sector. They further claim that the Europeans did not raise any objections when the relevant documents were provided to them at that time.
ERA’s rebuttal is proverbial. It is placed in the right column of the page (with the Ministry’s claim on the left), while the letter R (Rejected) is inserted in the middle to indicate rejection. Furthermore, it is characteristic that the same rebuttal is used as a template to reject the next three (2-4) justifications from the Greek side. In addition to the technical elements concerning the references to the articles of Directive 2016/798, it states:
The assessment team’s position is that the responsibilities assigned to a Member State cannot be transferred to a separate entity, in this case, the RRA, for which the duties are specified in Article 16 of the RSD Directive […] As this is essentially an incorrect transfer of an EU Directive, the decision does not fall within the competence of the ERA and is left to the European Commission. In any case, as regards the substance, the finding and the fact remain that no Greek entity assumes overall responsibility for ensuring that railway safety is generally maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously improved, which is an obligation of the Member State according to Article 4(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/798 (RSD).
2 – WHO COORDINATES
Greece’s second rejected reply concerns essentially the same issue. That is, the ERA has emphasized that “the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the general maintenance and, where reasonably practicable, the continuous improvement of railway safety rests with the central authorities of the Member States”, i.e. the Ministries. Even if certain activities can be delegated to other bodies, this must be done under clearly defined conditions, while monitoring and ultimately coordination will continue to be carried out at the Member State level. The Greek Ministry reiterated that the Independent Authorities are part of the legal entities of the Greek State and are part of the central administration of the country and therefore “the assignment of the relevant role to the RRA is primarily a delegation of competence and not a transfer of competence from another entity”. It was not convincing.
3 – WITHOUT SAFETY PLANS
Before receiving the third blow, the Greek side tried to respond to the comment that, in the context of the redistribution of roles and responsibilities in safety matters, the ERA assessment team did not find a single “annual safety plan” at a national level. The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation hastens to shift the blame to the RRA, stating that “the responsibility for drafting safety plans describing the measures envisaged to achieve the Common Safety Targets (CSTs) is the responsibility of the RRA”. It admits as a fact “that the RRA has not prepared the relevant safety plans” and blames it, saying that “no issue was raised with the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation about the RRA’s inability to prepare them”, while also criticizing the ERA, which should have monitored compliance. As mentioned above, this claim is also rejected by the ERA.
4 – POOR IMPLEMENTATION
On the fourth point, which again concerns the allocation of responsibilities to the RRA and the absence of an entity with overall responsibility, the Greek side tries to patch things up but is again rejected. Previously, it had acknowledged the conclusion “regarding the deficient implementation in practice of the relevant institutional framework”, but it asks for a “rewording regarding the recognition of the overall responsibility for implementation since it is not generally distributed among entities, as could be inferred but concerns the RRA, which, as mentioned above, bears the relevant responsibility”. Finally, it calls for the “valuable guidance of the ERA in creating a mechanism whereby the Member State can identify deficiencies and then meet the needs of the RRA to ensure the necessary resource adequacy”. Capital R continues to reign supreme.
5 – RISK REGISTER
The fifth “slap” concerns the ERA assessors’ observation that the Greek railway sector stakeholders do not follow a “risk-based approach”.
The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation responds that this observation is “general and needs clarification” and that “the railway cannot operate without such an approach”. It also mentions that the OSE (Hellenic Railways Organization) has established the risk management procedure D-19 and a risk register “which includes, among other things, measures to be taken in case of risk”.
The ERA’s response is clear: “The existence of a document recording risks does not mean that organizations follow a risk-based approach. The staff interviewed were not aware of the contents of the risk register, indicating a lack of risk awareness. Moreover, in some cases, these documents are not tailored to the activities of the entities. During the visit to the OSE, no risk assessment was presented to support the introduction of operational rules. Interviews with railway companies, such as Hellenic Train, confirmed that in many cases the opinion of the companies was not sought before the adoption of operational rules. During the interview with the OSE, senior management showed a lack of awareness of the risks managed by the company. During the interview, ways to manage certain risks identified as priorities by senior management were discussed and the interviewees could not show the risk register where they were recorded. Specifically, in one case it was mentioned that the risk management documentation was prepared by suppliers outside the organization and senior management could not review the documentation during the interview”.
6 – RELATIONS BETWEEN OSE / ERGOSE
The sixth point concerns the problematic relationship between OSE as the infrastructure manager and ERGOSE as the constructor of infrastructure projects. OSE cannot effectively monitor the implementation of risk control measures within ERGOSE, nor can it reject its deliverables as defined by the ERA.
In its reply, the Ministry states that ERGOSE implements projects following the European Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI). It also states that it seeks the approval of the OSE for the basic characteristics of the projects. It even goes so far as to mention the “recent railway reform regarding the mechanism for the production of railway projects”, stating that it was “voted on, approved, closely monitored and financed under the Recovery Fund last year”. This reference refers to Law 4974, passed under the Kostas Karamanlis government in September 2022, which was never implemented. Interestingly, Kostas Karamanlis’ successor, Christos Staikouras, announced in early 2024 that he would change the plan, and instead of the separation of ERGOSE from OSE as foreseen in Law 4974/2022, a merger of the entities would be designed.
Nevertheless, in October, ERA responded clearly: “Security is more than just the implementation of technical specifications for interoperability,” “It requires the safe integration of these technical systems into an operational framework,” and “the assessment team found no evidence that this aspect is covered.”
7 – CONFUSION OF ROLES
This point concerns the responsibility for the safe operation of the railway system and the European principle that risk control is the responsibility of the infrastructure managers (e.g. OSE) and the railway companies (e.g. Hellenic Train). ERA has pointed out that “this basic principle and the means for its implementation do not seem to be fully understood by all stakeholders in Greece”.
The Greek side responds by asking for clarification on “who was consulted” on the matter. It then listed the various safety certificates obtained by OSE and Hellenic Train. However, this response is also rejected by ERA, which speaks of the picture formed during the assessment “based on the review of documents, observations, and interviews conducted by the assessment team during the on-site activities”. This does not contradict but rather reinforces the findings of the assessment of the safety management systems (SMS) of Hellenic Train,” it stresses.
8 – OSE IN MINISTERIAL ROLE
The eighth strike concerns the so-called national rules and the way they are formulated. One such rule is considered to be the General Traffic Regulation (GTR) for trains, and the ERA has found in its assessment that there is no opportunity for all stakeholders to participate in the formulation of National Rules, but that in most cases they are “imposed by OSE”.
The Ministry responds by asking for clarification on the source of this finding. It states that “the Ministry always consults with the entire railway sector when establishing/modifying/repealing National Safety Rules”, citing various examples such as the amendment of the GTR in 2019 and the republication of articles in 2020. Here it also takes a jab at the ERA, saying, “The rules in question were sent to the ERA in July 2020 and their assessment is still pending.”
Once again, ERA rejects the response, emphasizing that its findings are “based on interviews with the Ministry and confirmed by some of the stakeholders,” while “the evaluation team did not receive any evidence of consultation. It further counters the “jab” by stating that no railway company appears in the consultations mentioned by the Ministry.
9 – LEGAL COMPLEXITY
The Greek side tries unsuccessfully to respond to the observation that there is a “lack of understanding of the tools available” to achieve the security requirements and that this is “exacerbated by the complexity of the legal architecture in Greece, which creates ambiguities in the roles and responsibilities of the main operational actors”.
The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation states: “We do not agree with the comment about the complexity of the legislation as the responsibilities are clear and explicit. The response is also succinct: “Clarity of roles and responsibilities is of paramount importance. The implementation of these roles presents a different picture.
10 – CERTIFICATION BY…APPOINTMENT
In the tenth blow, the issue of the delegation of responsibilities from the state to RAS resurfaces, in particular the responsibility for certifying maintenance work on the railway. The Ministry is accused of having no procedure for either establishing RAS or supervising it as a certification body.
ERA’s dismissive response echoes sternly: “The recognition of RAS by the Greek Ministry is more than just an administrative appointment,” it writes, demanding that the Ministry verify RAS’s capabilities based on specific international standards.
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